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1 Introduction
Appropriative behavior, driven largely by unrestricted self-interest of vary-
ing degrees, a®ects many di®erent facets of economic life. The result is
con°ict of one form or another. In many forms, con°ict often involves the
actual use of violence or the threat of using violence|for example, in wars
between nations, civil wars, organized criminal activity including gang war-
fare, strikes and lockouts, and ordinary crime. However, there are more re-
¯ned forms of con°ict as well, for example, where groups of individuals com-
pete for economic advantage through lobbying, rent-seeking, and litigation.
But, the costs of con°ict extend well beyond the destructive consequences
of the occasional use of force. Resources allocated directly to appropriative
activities (to seize the property and wealth of others or to defend one's own
property and wealth) represent lost opportunities in production. Further-
more, the greater sense of insecurity and uncertainty generates allocative
distortions, for example, biasing the °ow of resources away from any sort of
investment that is vulnerable to theft or con¯scation by others.
Economists have only recently begun to allow for the possibility of con-
°ict and appropriation along side with production and trade in their study
of economic interactions. Yet, even within a relatively short span of time,
they have made some important progress in advancing our understanding
of how con°ict in°uences economic outcomes.1 Nevertheless, focussing pri-
marily on the implications of the darker side of self-interested behavior of
individuals (or unitary actors), this research seems somewhat incomplete in
its coverage. To be more precise, not much attention has been paid to the
issues that arise when appropriative activities are carried out by individuals
organized into groups.2
With an aim to start to close the gap, this paper extends the positive
analysis of stable group formation in Gar¯nkel (2004) by considering the role
of con°ict management within the group. The analysis builds on a simple
economic model that features a \winner-take-all" contest for control of some
resource. Without the formation of groups, each individual participates in
the contest independently. The winner, in turn, applies the resource in
the production of a homogeneous consumption good. By contrast, when a
1For an insightful overview of this emerging literature, see Skaperdas (2003).
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group forms, members pool their e®orts to secure the contestable resource. If
successful in this e®ort, they then apply the resource to a joint production
process. To highlight the role of con°ict management at this level, the
analysis abstracts from the potential gains that could be realized through
joint production as might be modelled, for example, by increasing returns
to scale in production.
Departing from the traditional theory of alliances that follows the pio-
neering work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), the analysis does not take the
groups' membership as given.3 Nor is \peace" assumed to prevail among
group members. Instead, the distribution of their joint product is subject to
another, separate con°ict|that is, between the members of the group. Just
as the possible emergence of con°ict between individuals in their economic
interactions can have important implications for the equilibrium distribu-
tion of resources and income, the possibility of con°ict between individuals
within groups should not be ignored.4 Furthermore, the analysis does not
appeal to the public-good nature of defense and appropriation to explain
the emergence of groups|for example, the cost-saving advantages realized
when taking defense measures against a common enemy [Sandler (1999)].5
The basis for group formation in this setting derives from the free-rider
problem. Speci¯cally, the individual's incentive to participate in the con°ict
over the contestable resource through her contributions to the group's col-
lective e®ort is lower than when the individual acts alone. For the individual
alone bears the full cost of her contribution, whereas the bene¯t possibly
realized would have to be shared with the other members. Hence, relative to
the case of individual con°ict, the formation of groups can reduce the inten-
sity of con°ict, thereby improving overall welfare.6 Applying the theory of
endogenous coalition structures|in the spirit of Bloch (1996), Chwe (1994)
3See Sandler and Hartley (2001) who provide an updated survey of this literature.
4Analyses in the literature on collective rent seeking|e.g., Nitzan (1991)|similarly
have two layers of con°ict, but e®ectively treat them as one. For given the group's sharing
rule, the two con°icts' outcomes are determined by each member's contribution to the
group's e®ort in the inter-group con°ict.
5While Skaperdas (1998) and Noh (2002) show, in di®erent though related settings with
three heterogeneous individuals, that a con°ict technology having this sort of property is
critical for the emergence of an alliance, Gar¯nkel (2004) suggests that such a technology
might not even be necessary.
6This idea is implicit in WÄ arneryd (1998), though he considers a somewhat di®erent
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and Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), among others|Gar¯nkel (2004) shows
that this e®ect alone may very well be su±cient to support the stability of
group formation in equilibrium.7
However, the scope for group formation in this context can be limited in
the sense that small groups tend to be more stable than large groups. This
tendency can be attributed, at least in part, to the one feature of this setting
that indirectly serves as the basis for group formation|namely, the con°ict
that emerges over the distribution of the joint product. Intra-group con°ict
means that each individual must devote some e®ort to secure a share of that
product for herself, implying a diversion of scarce resources away from pro-
duction. Following Grossman (2001), one can think of the members' e®orts
as an input into the process by which property rights are created or initial
claims to property are transformed into property rights in what is essen-
tially an anarchic environment. In the extreme case considered in Gar¯nkel
(2004) where the distribution of the winning group's product is determined
solely by these e®orts, each individual's expected payo® is strictly decreasing
in her group's size. For an increase in group size induces more aggressive
competition between group members for a share of the product, implying a
greater diversion of resources away from productive activities. The absence
of con°ict management within the group severely limits the appeal and thus
the stability of larger groups in equilibrium.
Of course, one could argue that there are possible synergistic e®ects from
organized economic activities and production that might alleviate the added
instability that is associated with larger groups. In developing countries, for
example, gains are realized in the pooling of resources and the sharing of
risks as a form of community insurance. In developed countries, gains arise
from the division of labor and specialization of production e®ected through
the organization of the production process. However, the realization of such
gains are predicated on the existence of some set of stable institutions|
rules that govern joint or collective production and rules that govern the
division of the gains themselves.8 In other words, the possible advantages
7As discussed in more detail below, the equilibrium notion employed here, farsighted
stability which is attributed speci¯cally to Chwe (1994), expands the opportunities for
\cooperation" among individuals who would behave otherwise in a noncooperative way.
8See Knight (1992) for a lucid discussion of the collective bene¯ts of social institutions.
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from joint production need not expand the role of group formation unless
some mechanisms for managing intra-group con°ict are already in place.
As such, the analysis focusses instead simply on con°ict management,
supposing that individuals within a group might be able to resolve the con-
°ict that naturally arises over the distribution of the resources available
to them or the product of their labor in more \civilized" ways involving
less \social waste." Remaining agnostic about when institutions of con°ict
management emerge and how their e®ectiveness is determined, the analy-
sis supposes that the actual distribution of the group's product among its
members depends on a weighted average of (i) a \binding" agreement for
the group members to share their joint product equally and (ii) the out-
come of an intra-group contest, separate from that between groups.9 The
weight on the equal-sharing rule re°ects the strength of the group's exist-
ing institutions to manage con°ict, whether it be through the creation and
enforcement of formal rules and laws or through social norms, without hav-
ing to resort to appropriative activities. Thus, the more e®ective is the
management of intra-group con°ict, the fewer resources are diverted from
production in the process by which each member is able to secure a share
of the group's product for herself.10
While con°ict management weakens the free-rider problem, it does not
eliminate it. Thus, allowing for more peaceful and hence less costly mecha-
nisms of managing con°ict within the group expands the opportunities for
group formation. Indeed, as long as the distribution of the group's joint
product is determined partly by such mechanisms, the formation of the
grand coalition is always a possible outcome. More generally, given the
number of individuals in competition for the contestable resource, when
mechanisms of con°ict management are relatively more important in deter-
mining the distribution of the group's joint product, a greater variety of
group structures, including those with larger groups, are possible in equilib-
rium. As such mechanisms become su±ciently e®ective, even structures with
evolution is to understand their distributional e®ects, the con°ict such e®ects generate
and how that con°ict is resolved.
9The endogenous determination of con°ict management within groups is left for fu-
ture research as discussed below. [See Genicot and Skaperdas (2002) who model con°ict
management as an investment choice in a dynamic setting.]
10Of course, some institutions would seem to promote con°ict (e.g., in the form of
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larger groups become stable. However, larger is not unconditionally better.
Provided that some intra-group con°ict remains such that some resources
must be diverted from production, aggregate expected payo®s eventually
begin to decrease in group size. The grand coalition, in particular, is gen-
erally not the e±cient outcome and thus there is no compelling reason to
suppose that, among those which are stable, it is the most likely to emerge.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the model
of con°ict which allows for the formation of multi-member groups. Treating
the pre-con°ict determination of the structure of groups as given, section 3
characterizes the allocation of resources and payo®s. Section 4 then studies
the endogenous formation of groups, characterizing stable group structures,
the role of less costly methods of con°ict resolution within groups and their
welfare implications. Section 5 o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 Analytical framework
Consider an environment populated by N identical, risk-neutral individuals,
I = f1;2;:::;Ng, who participate in a three-stage game. In the ¯rst stage,
agents i 2 I form coalitions or groups. A group is de¯ned as any subset of
the population, Ak µ I, with membership nk ¸ 1, where k = 1;2;:::;A and
A denotes the total number of groups. For future reference, let the structure
of groups be indicated by S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, with the groups ordered such
that n1 ¸ n2 ¸ n3 ¢¢¢ ¸ nA. By de¯nition, all individuals belong to a group.
However, a group need not include more than one member. Moreover, this
framework admits the possibility that everyone comes together to form a
single group|the grand coalition: A1 = f1;2;:::;Ng.
2.1 Stage 2: Con°ict between groups
In the second stage, all individuals participate in a winner-take-all con-
°ict/contest over a resource X, which is essential in the production of a
homogeneous consumption good in the third stage. They participate either
collectively with others or alone, as dictated by the structure of groups de-
termined in stage one. For any given con¯guration of groups, each member
i 2 Ak chooses how much she will contribute to the group's appropriativeGroup Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 6
e®ort, mi.11 The probability that group k wins the con°ict and successfully













i2Aj mi > 0; otherwise, ¹k = 1=A for all k.12
Members of any group k with nk > 1, by assumption, have no special
advantage over those individuals who choose to participate in the con°ict on
their own.13 Nevertheless, this formulation captures one aspect of the public-
good nature of appropriation/defense spending. In particular, appropriative
e®orts by di®erent members of a given group are perfect substitutes for one
another. Regardless of who provides any additional e®ort, all members enjoy
the increased probability of securing the resource X it implies.
2.2 Stage 3: Joint production and con°ict within the group
To ¯x ideas, suppose that group k, with nk > 1, successfully captures the
resource X. Individuals not belonging to that group, i 2 Ak0 where k0 6= k,
receive nothing, implying that their second-stage e®orts result only in a loss
over the three stages uik0 = ¡mi.14 This loss is simply the utility cost of
11Since production is not possible until the resource is secured, the cost of this e®ort,
as speci¯ed below, can be interpreted as foregone leisure.
12This speci¯cation, ¯rst introduced by Tullock (1980) for individual rent-seeking, is
the contest success function most commonly used in the con°ict/contest, rent-seeking
literature. As argued below, although it admits the possibility of a corner solution for
all members of all groups, such a solution is not a possible equilibrium outcome. See
Hirshleifer (1989) who discusses the properties of this speci¯cation and related ones. Note
that, under the maintained assumption of risk-neutrality, a group's probability of winning
and taking the entire prize X, ¹k, may be interpreted alternatively as its resource share.










With N = 3, he ¯nds that a stable alliance between two of the three agents is possible
only when ° > 1 (i.e., under super-additivity). Noh (2002) obtains a similar result with a
slightly di®erent speci¯cation to allow for such e®ects.
14In other words, the second-stage con°ict weakens individuals i 2 Ak0 su±ciently such
that it is not possible for them to try to steal the product from the winning group in the
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the individual's second-stage e®ort, which increases linearly in that e®ort.
Now consider the members of the winning group k. Each i 2 Ak is
identically endowed with a unit of labor, which she allocates to productive
activities, li, and appropriative or security related activities, si, where
1 = li + si: (2)
These activities using X, in turn, deliver goods for consumption at the end of
the stage. Speci¯cally, individuals i 2 Ak collectively combine the resource
X with a fraction of their labor endowment, li = 1 ¡ si in a joint (linear)
production process to yield a homogeneous consumption good. Generally,
for nk ¸ 1 using (2), the group's total product, Yk, is speci¯ed as|
Yk =
P
i2Ak[1 ¡ si]X=nk: (3)
Although X might be considered a public good from the perspective of the
second-stage (winner-take-all) con°ict, at this stage X would be interpreted
as a purely private good.15
For nk > 1, each member must also devote some e®ort, si, towards
securing a share of the ¯nal product. This latter activity, re°ecting the
con°ict that emerges within the winning group, detracts from production.
Assume that the share of ¯nal output, Yk, enjoyed by agent i 2 Ak, ¾ik,
depends on her security e®ort si, distinct from mi, and on the e®ort by
everyone else in her group, sj for j 6= i 2 Ak. But her share need not







; ® 2 [0;1] (4)
15Specifying production as a joint process is common in the emerging literature on the
e®ects of con°ict on economic outcomes. [See, for example, the survey by Gar¯nkel and
Skaperdas (2000).] Allowing for complementarities or increasing returns in production
would provide another potential bene¯t of group formation. However, given the linear
homogeneity of the technology as speci¯ed here, one need not suppose that there is any
sort of interaction between group members in production. An alternative interpretation
of the production technology (3) is that each member of the winning group takes an equal
share of X at the beginning of the third stage and produces in isolation of the others.
In this case, the share ¾ik, de¯ned below in (4), would represent the fraction of her own
product that member i defends and that which she captures from the other members of
her group k.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 8
if
P
j2Ak sj > 0; otherwise, ¾ik = 1=nk for all i 2 Ak.16 Each member i 2
Ak, then, obtains a payo® of uik = ¾ikYk ¡ mi. Whether her group secures
the resource or not, each individual alone bears the cost of her contribution
to group's e®ort in the second-stage con°ict. Even if the members could
credibly agree to share the group's joint product equally (® = 0)|as if the
intra-group con°ict could be resolved peacefully, implying that si = 0 for all
i 2 Ak and ¾ik = 1=nk|the free-rider problem would remain relevant.
But, there is no presumption of \peace" here. While involved in a joint
production process in the third stage, each member must devote some e®ort
(si > 0) to secure a share of output given ® > 0. Nevertheless, the anal-
ysis does admit the possibility that (exogenously given) social institutions
can mediate con°ict within the group, and in doing so have implications for
inter-group con°ict.17 In the context of this model, 1 ¡ ® ¸ 0 measures
the e®ectiveness of existing mechanisms of con°ict management to deter-
mine the distribution of the group's product without having to rely on the
members' current appropriative activities. Put di®erently, smaller values of
® would re°ect stronger social institutions to e®ect a less costly resolution
of group con°ict. But, in supposing that ® > 0 holds and, in addition,
that some e®ort is required in the production process, the analysis of the
model's third stage captures the fundamental trade-o® between production
and appropriation, ¯rst modelled half a century ago by Haavelmo (1954, pp.
91-98) and considered more recently by Gar¯nkel (1990), Hirshleifer (1991,
1995), Skaperdas (1992), and Grossman and Kim (1995), among others.18
16Note that, for nk = 1, ¾ik = 1 regardless of the choice of si. This speci¯cation
is similar to the sharing rule found in the collective rent seeking literature [e.g., Nitzan
(1991)]. However, in contrast to the literature, the resolution of the intra-group con°ict
is determined independently of the members' relative choices of mi.
17Related analyses which have considered more speci¯cally the interrelations between
democratic political institutions and international con°ict, include Gar¯nkel (1994) and
Hess and Orphanides (2001), among others.
18That such a trade-o® does not emerge in the second stage might appear to be im-
portant for the central results of the analysis. What is important here, however, is that
individuals do not fully internalize the bene¯ts of their e®orts in ¯ghting over X relative
to the costs they incur. In particular, the ¯ndings of this analysis would follow if it were
alternatively based on a framework that is more in line with the collective rent-seeking
literature such as that in Noh (2002), provided it was also modi¯ed so that individuals
also valued leisure. Such a modi¯cation would drive a wedge between the individual's
incentives and the collective interests of the group. By the same token, the qualitative
results would remain intact if the analysis were based on a model in which there was noGroup Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 9
3 The allocation of resources given the group structure
Treating the pre-con°ict determination of the coalition structure S as given,
the analysis now considers the allocation of resources in the second and
third stages. Each individual aims to maximize her expected payo® which
equals her expected consumption in the third stage net of the utility cost
of her e®ort in securing the contestable resource in the second stage: ue
ik =
¹k¾ikYk ¡mi. In this multi-stage setting, the amount of resources available
to anyone in the third stage will, of course, depend on second-stage choices.
All individuals, when making their second-stage choices, will take this in-
°uence into account. In accordance with the equilibrium notion of subgame
perfection, then, we solve the model backwards, starting with the third and
¯nal stage.
3.1 The outcome of the intra-group con°ict
Given the outcome of the second-stage con°ict over X, equations (3) and
(4) imply that the payo® for each member i of the winning group k, uik =
















5 ¡ mi (5)
Each individual i 2 Ak chooses si to maximize this expression. Assume that
group members make their third-stage choices simultaneously.
The con°ict technology shown in (4) with ® > 0 generally implies that,
if no appropriative e®ort were made by any member of the group, then
anyone could capture all of ®Yk with certainty by putting forth an in¯nitesi-
mally small amount of e®ort. Since no one would leave such an opportunity
unexploited even with ® arbitrarily close to zero, the \peaceful" outcome
where si = 0 for all i 2 Ak cannot be an equilibrium outcome. As such, the
production in the third stage, as in the models of sequential con°ict of Katz and Tokatlidu
(1996) and WÄ arneryd (1998).Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 10




















with strict equality for si < 1. Given the symmetry of the group's member-
ship, this condition implies that members choose the same labor allocation,
si = s, resulting in an interior optimum: si 2 (0;1) for all i 2 Ak. Us-
ing equations (3), (4) and (5), condition (6) as a strict equality implies the
following Nash equilibrium of the third stage:
^ sk =
®(nk ¡ 1)




[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk
¡ mi; (7b)
for all i 2 Ak. In this equilibrium for any ® 2 [0;1], each member of the
winning group enjoys an equal share of ¯nal output: ¾ik = 1=nk, which is
decreasing in the size of the group, nk.19 For ® > 0, given mi, because a
larger nk implies a greater dilution of the prize X and a greater diversion
of e®ort away from production towards security, the payo® is decreasing
in the square of the size of the group. Note further that e®ective group
con°ict management (i.e., a smaller ®) diminishes the latter e®ect. While
sk is increasing in ®, ^ u(mi;nk) is decreasing in ®.
3.2 The outcome of the inter-group con°ict
Now consider the second-stage con°ict between groups, again with the struc-
ture of groups ¯xed. Each individual i belonging to group k chooses mi to
maximize the expected value of (7b), given by
^ ue(mi;nk) =
¹kX
[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk
¡ mi (8)
subject to the con°ict technology, ¹k, as speci¯ed in (1). Individuals in all
A groups make their decisions simultaneously. In (8), the ¯rst term repre-
19Of course, as indicated earlier, the speci¯cation for the con°ict resolution technology
(4) implies that for i 2 Ak, where nk = 1 or ® = 0, si = ¹ s = 0.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 11
sents the product enjoyed by member i of group k, having won the con°ict,
weighted by the winning probability, ¹k. The second term represents the
utility cost of ¯ghting over the contestable resource; it is borne solely by the
individual regardless of the outcome of that con°ict.




i2Aj mi > 0, a fully interior solution is not guaranteed for all con-
¯gurations of groups when A > 2. That is to say, the members of one or more
groups might choose mi = 0. But, the stability of a given con¯guration does
require that all groups actively participate in the second-stage con°ict.20 In
anticipation of our subsequent focus on stable groups and in the interest of
brevity, the analysis to follow considers only such solutions. Accordingly,










[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk
¸
= 1: (9)
Maintaining focus on the case of within-group symmetry (i.e., when mi











j=1 njmj.21 With this condition, one can ¯nd the equilibrium
e®ort put forth by each individual belonging to group k of size nk, given the
structure of groups, S:
m(nk;S) = [F ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®(nk ¡ 1))nk]
(A ¡ 1)X
nkF2 (11)
for all k, where F ´
PA
j=1[1 + ®(nj ¡ 1)]nj.22
20See Lemma 2 in Appendix A.1, which follows the tables at the end of the paper.
21Note, however, since the probability of winning X depends on
P
i2Ak mi, not just
mi, only total e®ort by the group is uniquely determined; individual e®ort, mi, is not.
Although the focus here on the symmetric outcome may make the emergence of groups
more likely, this focus seems most natural given the assumption that individual members
of the group are identical.
22Speci¯cally, rewrite (10) as X(M ¡ nkmk) = M
2[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk, and sum over all
groups, k = 1;2;:::;A to obtain AXM ¡ XM = M
2 PA
j=1[1 + ®(nj ¡ 1)]nj. Simplifying
and rearranging shows that, in equilibrium, M = X(A ¡ 1)=F, which with (10) yieldsGroup Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 12
In the case where all groups are of equal size n ¸ 1, S ´ ^ S = fn;:::;ng,23
the solution shown in (11) simpli¯es to ^ m ´ m(n; ^ S) = (N ¡ n)X=N2n[1 +
®(n ¡ 1)]. Under individual con°ict where S = ^ S = ¹ S,24 this solution
simpli¯es even further to ¹ m ´ m(1; ¹ S) = (N ¡ 1)X=N2. By contrast, when
the grand coalition forms n = N, m(n; ^ S) = 0. As can easily be con¯rmed,
under alternative, less extreme symmetric structures given N(= An), 1 ·
n · N, m(n; ^ S) is decreasing in n or equivalently increasing in A.
For any given structure of groups with mk > 0 for all k, the solution for
m(nk;S) reveals more generally that the equilibrium e®ort by the individual
members of group k in the inter-group con°ict is decreasing in the size of the
group, nk, as is the total e®ort by the group, nkm(nk;S). Not surprisingly,
then, the expected probability of winning the con°ict in stage 2, given by
¹k = [F ¡ (A ¡ 1)[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk]=F for A > 1, is also decreasing in the
group size, nk.
Using this expression for ¹k, (8), and (11), the payo® expected by each
individual member of group k at the end of stage one, ue(nk;S), can be
written as
ue(nk;S) =
X[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk][F ¡ (A ¡ 1)[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]]
[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nkF2 (12)
for k = 1;2;:::;A, where as previously de¯ned, F ´
PA
j=1[1+®(nj ¡1)]nj
and S = fn1;n2 :::;nAg.
Not surprisingly then, given any structure of groups where mk > 0 for
k = 1;2;:::;A, individuals belonging to larger groups expect a smaller
payo® than the payo® expected by those belonging to smaller groups:
ue(n1;S) · ue(n2;S) · ¢¢¢ · ue(nA;S) (13)
where by assumption n1 ¸ n2 ¸ ::: ¸ nA.25 Of course, this ranking says
(11). From this solution, it follows that mk > 0 for all k provided that F > (A ¡ 1)[1 +
®(nk ¡1)]nk holds for nk = n1. One necessary condition shown in Lemma 1 of Appendix
A.1 is that the number of singleton groups must be strictly less than 2, or nA¡1 ¸ 2.
23Ignoring integer problems in this symmetric case, A = N=n and F = N[1+®(n¡1)].
24In this case, F = N.
25One might conjecture that this ranking depends on the assumption, commonly madeGroup Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 13
nothing about an individual's incentive to move from one group to another,
as it does not account for the e®ect of the hypothetical move on the e®orts
levels m by anyone in the stage-two con°ict or others' incentive to move in
response. Such incentives are considered more carefully in the analysis of
the stable formation of groups that follows next.
4 Endogenous group formation and con°ict management
Having characterized the allocation of resources in the second and third
stages of the game given the structure of groups, the analysis now turns
to the ¯rst stage of the game|namely, the formation of groups in equilib-
rium. In particular, de¯ning an equilibrium of the ¯rst stage as an outcome
where no individual can possibly increase her expected payo®, the analysis
endogenizes the structure of groups, S.
4.1 Expected gains under symmetric group formation
As a preliminary step to that analysis, this subsection illustrates the gains
that individuals might expect under a symmetric, multi-member coalition
structure|i.e., where nk = n > 1 for all k: ^ S ´ fn;:::;ng. Using the
expression for an individual's expected payo® given in (12), the expected
gains under such a structure of groups relative to the outcome of individual
con°ict, Ge(n) ´ ue(n; ^ S) ¡ ue(1; ¹ S), can be written as
Ge(n) =
[(N ¡ ®n)(n ¡ 1)]X
N2n[1 + ®(n ¡ 1)]
(14)
in the literature as well as in this paper, of linear costs of e®ort in the inter-group con°ict.
Analyzing a model of collective action (with e®ectively just one layer of con°ict), Esteban
and Ray (2001) show that, if instead these costs are increasing su±ciently quickly in e®ort
(or money as the case may be), then the group's probability of winning the con°ict would
be increasing in its size. Nevertheless, they also ¯nd that, if the prize is purely private as
in the present analysis, the expected payo® to each member would be decreasing in group
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for n > 1.26 Some straightforward calculations based on this expression
establish the following:
Proposition 1 Under a symmetric structure of coalitions, with nk = n > 1
8 k = 1;2;:::;A, the gains expected by each individual, Ge(n), are
(a) strictly positive for n < N,
(b) equal to 0 for n = N when ® = 1,
(c) strictly positive for n = N when ® < 1, and
(d) increasing in n, for ® < N
(n¡1)2N+n2
The potential for greater expected payo®s under group formation suggests
that the cost-saving advantage to appropriative/defense activities by a group,
which has been highlighted especially in the literature on alliances in inter-
national relations, might not be essential to the formation of multi-member
groups. In the context of this simple model, the expected gains come in the
form of a reduction in the severity of con°ict over the contestable resource
X for 1 < n < N regardless the extent to which the intra-group con°ict
can be resolved without having to devote e®ort speci¯cally to that process
(® 2 [0;1]). No member of a group with n > 1 fully internalizes the bene¯ts
of her e®orts in that con°ict and so naturally devotes less e®ort to it. In
the symmetric outcome, everyone else is doing just the same, so that the
net e®ect on the winning probabilities in the con°ict over X relative to the
case of individual con°ict is zero. Thus, as Proposition 1 indicates, there
are potential gains under symmetric group formation, with n < N.
The proposition also suggests, however, that the expected gains are lim-
ited, and more so the closer is ® to 1. In the limiting case where ® = 1, such
that resolving the con°ict that arises within the group depends entirely on
si, the expected gains Ge(n) fall as the number of members in each group, n,
rises above 1. As n increases and the second-stage con°ict between groups
weakens, the third-stage con°ict over the distribution of the product within
the group intensi¯es; from an ex ante perspective, the increased costs asso-
ciated with the intensifying intra-group con°ict exceed the decreased costs
associated with the weakening inter-group con°ict. As n approaches N,




e(1; ¹ S) can be derived from (12) assuming
nk = 1 for all k: u
e(1; ¹ S) = X=N
2. Note that the function shown in (14) is also de¯ned
for n = 1: G
e(1) = 0.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 15
the expected gains from group formation go to zero. Of course, the actual
outcome under group formation with n = N will di®er from that under
individual con°ict by virtue of the di®erence in the nature of the con°ict
in the two outcomes. But, since ® = 1 by assumption, the group has no
means by which its members can resolve con°ict without resorting to arms
(s); therefore, when ® = 1 a move from individual con°ict (n = 1) to the
grand coalition (n = N) merely shifts the entire con°ict from one level over
X to another over Y , with no consequences in terms of expected payo®s.
Still, for n < N, Ge(n) > 0 holds, so that the formation of symmetric groups
on net enhances expected welfare. Gar¯nkel (2004) shows that, even in this
very restrictive case, the expected gains arising from the free-rider problem
alone are often su±cient to predict the emergence of groups in equilibrium.
But, a central issue here is how the e®ectiveness of managing con°ict
over the distribution of the group's joint product can enhance the bene¯ts
of group formation. Consider the other limiting case. If the members of
a group could credibly agree to share the product equally without arming
(s = 0), then ® = 0. The expected payo® under symmetric group for-
mation, given by ue(n;S) = [N(n ¡ 1) + n]=N2n in this case, would be
increasing monotonically in n, so that the expected gains under group for-
mation, Ge(n) = (n ¡ 1)X=Nn, would also be increasing in n · N and
strictly positive when evaluated at n = N. For intermediate values of ®,
® 2 (0;1), as n, rises above 1, the expected gains rise and continue to rise
until n reaches some threshold value above which the gains begin to fall.
For n in excess of this threshold the expected gain is decreasing in n.27
Nonetheless, for ® < 1, the expected gains at n = N are strictly positive.
4.2 Deviations and stable group structures
There are, of course, potential gains from forming asymmetric groups too.
The magnitude of these gains similarly would be in°uenced by the e®ec-
tiveness of managing the con°ict that emerges over the distribution of the
group's joint product. But, now we turn to a more systematic analysis
of equilibrium, taking into account the possible bene¯ts that an individ-
27To give a speci¯c example, for ® =
1
4 and N = 100, the expected gains are increasing
as we move from n = 2 (A = 50) to n = 4 (A = 25), but decrease as we increase n any
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ual might realize by breaking away from her group as well as the potential
bene¯ts she and others can realize under group formation.
Recall that, under any given group structure, the payo® expected by
each member of a group is smaller for larger groups [see equation (13)].
Thus, despite the positive gains to be realized under group formation, any
individual could have an incentive to deviate|for example, to break from
one multi-member group to join a smaller one or form her own stand-alone
group. To ¯x ideas, the analysis de¯nes an equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition. A structure of groups, S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, is a stable, Nash
equilibrium structure if (i) the payo® expected by each individual under that
structure is at least as large as that under individual con°ict and strictly
larger for at least one individual, and (ii) any deviation from that structure
by an individual eventually makes that individual worse o®.
This de¯nition is related to the notion of farsighted stability, which follows
the non-cooperative theory of coalition formation|including Bloch (1996)
and Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), among others|but is attributed speci¯-
cally to Chwe (1994).28 This equilibrium concept imposes certain internal
consistency requirements, ruling out possible deviations. In particular, sta-
bility requires that the equilibrium be robust to deviations, which must be
robust to further deviations themselves. The farsightedness of the equi-
librium concept employed here requires the robustness of all subsequent
deviations as well until a stable outcome is reached. Thus, individuals are
envisioned as looking to the eventual (stable) payo® of a deviation from the
structure of groups under consideration. Therefore, the evaluation of the
potential gains from a given deviation must factor in the possibility of all
subsequent deviations by other individuals and the resulting impact on ex-
pected payo®s. In the context of this model, although any individual would
bene¯t, for example, by leaving her group to form her own group (with
just one member) given the membership of the other groups and her for-
mer group, such deviations could ultimately induce a reversion to individual
con°ict, leaving everyone, including the original deviator, worse o®. Accord-
ingly, such deviations themselves would be deemed unpro¯table and, thus,
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would not pose a threat to the stability of group structure under considera-
tion.29 With such an emphasis on forward looking behavior, the equilibrium
notion of farsighted stability tends to expand the opportunities for \cooper-
ation" among individuals who would behave otherwise in a noncooperative
way.30
For an open membership game in which no consent is required to join
an already existing group, one must also verify that no individual has an
incentive to leave her group to join another. From the discussion above, it
should be clear that no individual would have an incentive to leave her group
to join equal sized or larger group [see section 3.2]. However, there may be
an incentive to join a smaller group. In fact, when the size of the largest
group exceeds the smallest by 2 or more, each member of the largest group,
k = 1, has an incentive, holding the rest of the structure of groups (including
her own former group k = 1) ¯xed, to join one of the smaller groups. Ruling
out such incentives requires that the largest group have, at most, one more
member than any other group: n1 · nj + 1 for any j = 2;:::;A.31
Based on the discussion above, we have the following:
Proposition 2 (Symmetric Groups.) Suppose that the number of indi-
viduals involved in the con°ict over the contestable resource X, N, can be
decomposed into the product of two integers, A¤ > 1 and n¤ > 1. Then,
for all ® 2 [0;1], the symmetric multi-member structure of coalitions with
A¤ groups each having n¤ members, ^ S¤ = fn¤;:::;n¤;g, is farsighted stable
and a Nash equilibrium structure. Furthermore, when ® 2 [0;1), the grand
coalition (A¤ = 1 and n = N ¸ 2) is a possible equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
29Of course, without having speci¯ed the dynamics that would take us from a potential
deviation to the outcome involving individual con°ict, invoking the notion of farsighted
stability here might seem ad hoc at best. However, the analysis in connection with Lemmas
1 and 2 in Appendix A.1 is suggestive. Moreover, this stability notion has much theoretical
appeal in its emphasis on internal consistency and on the importance of the eventual
outcome over the immediate outcome. On these points, see Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999).
30As noted below, however, even when only deviations by individuals are ruled out,
there are multiple equilibria in this context, and further re¯nements are possible.
31See Lemma 3 in Appendix A.1. Note that this result suggests that there are limits to
the possible gains that can be realized from group-size asymmetry, identi¯ed by Katz and
Tokatlidu (1996), once one allows for endogenous group formation. In their interesting
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The proposition establishes that, when 0 · ® · 1, all multi-member, sym-
metric coalition structures with A > 1 are stable. In addition, the relevance
of managing con°ict in the distribution of the group's product (® < 1) ex-
pands the opportunity for endogenous group formation simply by making
the emergence of the grand coalition possible.32 Thus, for ® < 1 and N ¸ 2,
there exists at least one multi-member equilibrium structure of groups|
namely, the grand coalition. However, farsighted stability is not limited to
symmetric group structures.
Proposition 3 (Asymmetric Groups.) Given N, choose any A¤, where
1 < A¤ < N, and de¯ne a ´ N ¡A¤n¤, where 1 · a < A¤. The asymmetric
multi-member structure of groups, with a groups having n¤ + 1 members
and A¤ ¡a groups having n¤ members, S¤ = fn¤ +1;:::;n¤ +1;n¤ :::;n¤g,
is farsighted stable and a Nash equilibrium structure provided n¤ satis¯es
the inequality
[F ¡ (A¤ ¡ 1)(1 + ®n¤)(n¤ + 1)][F ¡ (A¤ ¡ 1)(1 + ®n¤)]
(1 + ®n¤)(n¤ + 1)F2 >
1
(A¤n¤ + a)2
and, in the case that a = 1, an additional inequality
A¤(n¤ ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n¤ ¡ 1)) + 1




where F = a(n¤ + 1)(1 + ®n¤) + (A¤ ¡ a)n¤(1 + ®(n¤ ¡ 1)).
Proof. See the appendix.
Under asymmetric group structures, although the expected gains are un-
evenly distributed, everyone must be at least as well o® as they would be
under individual con°ict. This requirement along with the requirement that
n1 · nj + 1 for any j = 2;:::;A, is embedded in the ¯rst inequality of
the proposition. The inequality ensures further that, for a = 2;:::;A¤ ¡ 1
given N, a deviation by one individual originally belonging to a size{n + 1
group to form a stand-alone group would make it pro¯table for at least one
other individual to follow her, which in turn would induce a reversion to
individual con°ict and thus prove to be unpro¯table. Therefore, the ¯rst
32Recall that when ® < 1, G
e(N) > 0; by contrast, when ® = 1, G
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inequality alone is a su±cient condition for the farsighted stability of groups
with a 2 (1;A). Matters may di®er, however, for groups with a = 1. Never-
theless, the second inequality serves to rule out the pro¯tability of individual
deviations in this case.33
The ¯rst inequality imposes a lower bound on n, given A¤ and a. This
lower bound on n limits the degree of asymmetry between the size{n groups
and the size{n + 1 groups so as not to give too much of an advantage to
the members of the smaller (size{n) groups in the contest for control of X.
For example, when n = 3, the advantage enjoyed by the smaller groups over
the larger groups (n + 1 = 4) is relatively more mild than when n = 2 (and
n+1 = 3). But, decreasing the number of larger sized groups (n+1) relative
to the number of the smaller sized groups (n) (or equivalently decreasing a
relative to A) puts members of the size{n + 1 groups at a relatively greater
disadvantage, implying a more severe lower bound on n is necessary to keep
those individuals from deviating. When a = 1 given N = An + 1, this
constraint is most binding. The second inequality shown in Proposition 2
similarly imposes a lower bound on n precisely when a = 1, though it is not
always binding. Here, the degree of con°ict management comes into play.
In particular, when exchange within groups is more peaceful (® is smaller),
an individual deviation to form a stand-along group is more likely to leave
the expected payo®s of everyone else (belonging to one of the A groups of
size n) above that obtained under individual con°ict. In this case given N,
the coalition structure with a = 1 cannot be supported in equilibrium. But
as ® increases, the second inequality is more likely to implied by the ¯rst
inequality even when a = 1.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate some of these tendencies, showing the stable
multi-member structure of groups based on Propositions 2 and 3, by the
equilibrium number of groups, A¤ for varying degrees of con°ict manage-
ment, ® = f0; 1
4; 1
2; 3
4;1g.34 Consider ¯rst the equilibrium structures when
® = 1. An inspection of the tables reveals that, given N and A¤, an equilib-
rium multi-member structure of groups need not exist|for N < 4, N = 5
33See the appendix for more details.
34Keep in mind that ® is a negative indicator of the degree of con°ict management. The
minimum values of n, minn
¤, given A and a 2 [1;A), for which a stable multi-member
structure of groups exists were calculated using Mathematica. Details are available upon
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and 7.35 But, as N increases, the conditions for stability, ruling out individ-
ual deviations only, weaken. Even when the distribution of the group's joint
product is determined by s alone (® = 1), there exists at least one stable,
multi-member structure of groups for any N ¸ 8, having A¤ = 2 groups:
for any even number N ¸ 8, both groups have n¤ = N=2 members; and,
for any odd number N > 8, one group has n¤ = (N ¡ 1)=2 members and
the other has just one additional member, n¤ +1 = (N +1)=2 [see Table 1].
And, as clearly shown in Table 2, other group structures are also possible.
Observe that, in general, for any given A¤ > 2, group structures with fewer
size{n+1 groups (or smaller a) are more likely to be farsighted stable when
N is larger.
The possibility of a less costly resolution of intra-group con°ict (i.e.,
® < 1) expands the opportunities for group formation considerably. First,
as noted earlier and shown in Table 1, the emergence of the grand coalition
is always a possibility for N ¸ 2 when 0 · ® < 1, in contrast to when
® = 1. Second, observe from Table 1 how min n¤, satisfying the inequality
in Proposition 3, depends positively on ®.36 In words, farsighted stability of
endogenous group formation is limited by the extent to which the distribu-
tion of the winning group's product is determined by arms or equivalently by
the weakness of the existing social institutions. Along similar lines, Table
2 shows a greater variety of possible equilibrium con¯gurations of multi-
member groups (2 · A · 6) for ® = 1
4 than for ® = 1, given 4 · N · 25.
However, also note that for ® = 0, the second inequality constraint from
Proposition 3 becomes binding. In this case, stable coalition formation with
a = 1 cannot be supported in equilibrium.
35In a similar economic setting where the free-rider problem emerges, Esteban and
S¶ akovics (2002) ¯nd no possibility for group formation. Their ¯nding, based on just three
players and no possibility of for intra-group \cooperation," is actually consistent with the
¯nding of the present analysis where N = 3 and ® = 1. Furthermore, while they allow for
increasing costs in the inter-group e®ort which would tend to make their result stronger,
they do not employ the equilibrium notion of farsighted stability.
36Thus, the minimum number of individuals in competition for the contestable resource
X (N = A
¤ £ minn
¤ + a) required for the stability of a given coalition structure is
smaller with smaller ®. For example, a structure consisting of 5 groups, 3 of which
have a = n + 1 members and 2 of which have A ¡ a = n members, requires at least
N = A
¤ £ minn
¤ + a = 23 when ® = 1; when ® =
1
2, N must be at least 18; and when
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4.3 Equilibrium structures and expected payo®s
Given the multiplicity of possible group structures, one would naturally
wonder how they would be ranked by the participants.37 Now for ® =
1, as considered in Gar¯nkel (2004), when N < 9 and there are multiple
equilibrium structures, they are all symmetric. Hence, from Proposition 1,
everyone would prefer the structure having the greatest number of groups,
A¤ = N=n¤ or equivalently the smallest number of group members, n¤ > 1.
Maintaining the assumption that ® = 1, in the case where both asymmetric
and symmetric groups are possible, the ranking is not so obvious.
Table 3a reports the expected payo®s per individual in each group, un-
der the alternative equilibrium group structures for 9 · N · 25. It also
reports the aggregate expected payo®s under each of those structures and
under individual con°ict. The table con¯rms that, under asymmetric group
structures, the bene¯ts of group formation relative to individual con°ict are
distributed unevenly.38 When more than one stable multi-member coalition
structure exists for a given N, the payo®s expected by members of the size{n
groups increase unambiguously as we move to another asymmetric structure
of groups with a larger number of groups, A¤. The same cannot be said for
members of size{n + 1 groups. While in some cases their expected payo®s
increase as well, sometimes they fall but never below what would be ex-
pected under individual con°ict as required by the de¯nition of equilibrium.
Furthermore, not surprisingly, as we move from an asymmetric structure
of groups to a symmetric one with a greater number of groups (A¤), the
payo®s expected by each member of a size{n group typically fall while those
expected by each member of a size{n+1 group rise. Nonetheless, note that
regardless of whether the group is symmetric or asymmetric, aggregate ex-
pected payo®s are unambiguously rising in the number of groups (A¤) for
any given N. However, this tendency is unique for ® = 1.
37One could sharpen the predictions of the analysis in terms of the number of groups
and the size of groups given N by applying the equilibrium re¯nement introduced by
Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987), to account for deviations of groups of individuals
as well as for individual deviations. There need not be any equilibrium at all, however.
In any case, such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper.
38Note that, consistent with the previous discussion, for any given A
¤ and a, the asym-
metry is smaller for larger n or equivalently larger N. Furthermore, given N, the expected
payo®s tend to be more evenly distributed when the number of size{n + 1 groups (a) is
larger relative to A
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Table 3b similarly reports the expected payo®s per individual in each
group, under the alternative equilibrium group structures, for 9 · N · 25,
when ® = 1
4. In the case of symmetric groups for a given N, observe that
increasing the number of groups and hence decreasing n need not imply
an increase in expected payo®s [e.g., when N = 12, increasing A from 4
to 6 groups]. Nevertheless, at least for each N considered here, given that
® ¸ 1
4 holds, there exist structures, either symmetric or asymmetric and
in some cases both, that yield higher expected payo®s to all individuals
than the grand coalition. Thus, there would not seem to be a very com-
pelling argument|certainly not one based on e±ciency grounds alone|for
the grand coalition to stand out as a focal point among all those group
structures which are farsighted stable. Of course, numerical simulations can
give only a partial picture at best. Table 3b, in particular, does not show all
possible coalition structures given N. More importantly, it considers only
one value of ®.
Table 4 provides some additional perspective, considering a considerably
larger N (N = 100) and a di®erent variety of ®'s, ® = f0; 1
100; 1
10;1g. Like
Tables 3a and 3b, it shows the expected payo®s for stable coalitions struc-
tures only. Note that for ® = 1, aggregate payo®s are monotonically increas-
ing in A (or equivalently decreasing in n). By contrast, for ® = 0 aggregate
payo®s are monotonically decreasing in A (or equivalently decreasing in n).
Hence, while one might predict the emergence of the equilibrium structure
with A = 50 and n = 2 when con°ict management is irrelevant in determin-
ing the distribution of the group's joint output (® = 1), under the equally
unpalatable assumption that such institutions alone can determine that dis-
tribution (® = 0) one might naturally predict the emergence of the grand
coalition (A = 1 and n = 100). However, the table also clearly indicates
that, when con°ict management is just a little less e®ective (® = 0:01), the
grand coalition is no longer an e±cient outcome. Everyone's expected payo®
could be increased if they were to break o® into smaller equally sized groups,
A = f2;4;5;10;20;25;50g. Decreasing the e®ectiveness of con°ict manage-
ment further (by setting ® = 0:10) implies that all of the other asymmetric
group structures similarly dominate the grand coalition. Even though the
grand coalition is a feasible outcome, it seems reasonable to conjecture that
the other stable structures are more or at least just as likely to emerge in
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the stable formation of groups, showing that
some form of con°ict management within groups enhances the possibilities
for group formation considerably, thereby weakening the con°ict between
groups. Most notably, the grand coalition can emerge for any number of
individuals N ¸ 2.
But what is especially striking is the ¯nding that, unless the existing
social institutions are su±ciently strong to render appropriative activities
within groups unnecessary, the grand coalition is not likely to emerge as the
\best" outcome.39 That individuals in this model are assumed to be identi-
cal only underscores the importance of studying multilayered or sequential
con°ict and thus intra-group governance in economics.
Admittedly, insofar as the building of social institutions to manage con-
°ict within the group is taken as exogenous and that the development of
such institutions is costly, the analysis here would seem incomplete. Thus,
an important and interesting extension, left for future research, would be to
endogenize the management of con°ict in a more dynamic setting.40 Such
an extension could reveal other fundamental tradeo®s that would, at the
same time though perhaps to varying degrees, in°uence the link between
economic performance and the degree of inter-group con°ict. In particular,
the development of institutions to manage con°ict and their maintenance
over time would divert scarce resources away from both production and
appropriative activities between groups. Whereas the diversion away from
production would hinder economic growth and development, the distraction
from preparations for inter-group con°ict could serve to promote peace and,
in the process, enhance economic performance.
39Analyses ¯nding a strong tendency for the emergence of the grand coalition|see,
for example, Bloch, S¶ anchez-Page¶ es and Soubeyran (2002)|typically abstract from the
di±culties of intra-group con°ict, assuming instead that the members are able to make
binding commitments to sharing rules.
40Genicot and Skaperdas (2002) have made some progress in this direction, though not
in the context of a framework with endogenous group formation.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 24
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Table 1. Equilibrium group structures, N > 1
minn¤
A¤ a A¤ ¡ a ® = 1 ® = 3=4 ® = 1=2 ® = 1=4 ® = 0
1 0 1 ¢ 2 2 2 2
2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 4 3 2 2 ¢
3 0 3 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 5 5 4 3 ¢
2 1 3 2 2 2 1
4 0 4 2 2 2 2 2
1 3 7 7 6 5 ¢
2 2 5 4 4 3 2
3 1 2 2 2 1 1
5 0 5 2 2 2 2 2
1 4 9 9 8 7 ¢
2 3 7 6 5 5 3
3 2 4 4 3 3 2
4 1 2 2 1 1 1
6 0 6 2 2 2 2 2
1 5 11 10 10 8 ¢
2 4 9 8 7 6 4
3 3 6 6 5 4 3
4 2 4 4 3 3 2
5 1 2 2 1 1 1
7 0 7 2 2 2 2 2
1 6 13 12 12 10 ¢
2 5 11 10 9 8 5
3 4 9 8 7 6 4
4 3 6 6 5 4 3
5 2 4 4 3 3 2
6 1 2 1 1 1 1
Notes: A¤ denotes the total number of groups, a of which have n + 1 members; the
remaining A¤ ¡ a have n members. Given A groups of which a are of size n¤ + 1, the
table indicates the minimum n that ensures the farsighted stability of the con¯guration
under consideration. That con¯guration is a possible equilibrium structure when at least
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Table 2. Equilibrium group sizes given 1 < A · 6 for N · 25
A
N 2 3 4 5 6
® = 1 4 (2;2) ¢
5 ¢ ¢ ¢
6 (3;3) (2;2;2) ¢ ¢
7 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
8 (4;4) ¢ (2;2;2;2) ¢ ¢
9 (5;4) (3;3;3) ¢ ¢ ¢
10 (5;5) ¢ ¢ (2;2;2;2;2) ¢
11 (6;5) (4;4;3) (3;3;3;2) ¢ ¢
12 (6;6) (4;4;4) (3;3;3;3) ¢ (2;2;2;2;2;2)
13 (7;6) ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
14 (7;7) (5;5;4) ¢ (3;3;3;3;2) ¢
15 (8;7) (5;5;5) (4;4;4;3) (3;3;3;3;3) ¢
16 (8;8) (6;5;5) (4;4;4;4) ¢ ¢
17 (9;8) (6;6;5) ¢ ¢ (3;3;3;3;3;2)
18 (9;9) (6;6;6) ¢ ¢ (3;3;3;3;3;3)
19 (10;9) (7;6;6) (5;5;5;4) (4;4;4;4;3) ¢
20 (10;10) (7;7;6) (5;5;5;5) (4;4;4;4;4) ¢
21 (11;10) (7;7;7) ¢ ¢ ¢
22 (11;11) (8;7;7) (6;6;5;5) ¢ ¢
23 (12;11) (8;8;7) (6;6;6;5) (5;5;5;4;4) (4;4;4;4;4;3)
24 (12;12) (8;8;8) (6;6;6;6) (5;5;5;5;4) (4;4;4;4;4;4)
25 (13;12) (9;8;8) ¢ (5;5;5;5;5)
...................................................................
® = 1
4 4 (2;2) ¢
5 (3,2) ¢ ¢
6 (3;3) (2;2;2) ¢ ¢
7 (4;3) ¢ (2;2;2;1) ¢
8 (4;4) (3;3;2) (2;2;2;2) ¢ ¢
9 (5;4) (3;3;3) ¢ (2;2;2;2;1) ¢
10 (5;5) (4;3;3) ¢ (2;2;2;2;2) ¢
11 (6;5) (4;4;3) (3;3;3;2) ¢ (2;2;2;2;2;1)
12 (6;6) (4;4;4) (3;3;3;3) ¢ (2;2;2;2;2;2)
13 (7;6) (5;4;4) ¢ ¢ ¢
14 (7;7) (5;5;4) (4;4;3;3) (3;3;3;3;2) ¢
15 (8;7) (5;5;5) (4;4;4;3) (3;3;3;3;3) ¢
16 (8;8) (6;5;5) (4;4;4;4) ¢ ¢
17 (9;8) (6;6;5) ¢ ¢ (3;3;3;3;3;2)
18 (9;9) (6;6;6) (5;5;4;4) (4;4;4;3;3) (3;3;3;3;3;3)
19 (10;9) (7;6;6) (5;5;5;4) (4;4;4;4;3) ¢
20 (10;10) (7;7;6) (5;5;5;5) (4;4;4;4;4) ¢
21 (11;10) (7;7;7) (6;5;5;5) ¢ ¢
22 (11;11) (8;7;7) (6;6;5;5) ¢ (4;4;4;4;3;3)
23 (12;11) (8;8;7) (6;6;6;5) (5;5;5;4;4) (4;4;4;4;4;3)
24 (12;12) (8;8;8) (6;6;6;6) (5;5;5;5;4) (4;4;4;4;4;4)
25 (13;12) (9;8;8) (7;6;6;6) (5;5;5;5;5) ¢Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 28
Table 3a. Expected payo®s under equilibrium structures, ® = 1
A
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 N
9 n ¢ 3.44 2.88 ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.23
n + 1 ¢ 1.37 2.88 ¢ ¢ ¢ 1.23
N ¢ 20.61 25.93 ¢ ¢ ¢ 11.11
10 n ¢ 1.80 ¢ ¢ 3.00 ¢ 1.00
n + 1 ¢ 1.80 ¢ ¢ 3.00 ¢ 1.00
N ¢ 18.00 ¢ ¢ 30.00 ¢ 10.00
11 n ¢ 2.17 5.32 12.36 ¢ ¢ 0.83
n + 1 ¢ 1.03 1.10 1.02 ¢ ¢ 0.83
N ¢ 16.99 24.80 33.87 ¢ ¢ 9.09
12 n ¢ 1.27 1.74 2.08 ¢ 2.43 0.69
n + 1 ¢ 1.27 1.74 2.08 ¢ 2.43 0.69
N ¢ 15.28 20.83 25.00 ¢ 29.17 8.33
13 n ¢ 1.49 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.59
n + 1 ¢ 0.79 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.59
N ¢ 14.48 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 7.69
14 n ¢ 0.95 2.83 ¢ 12.00 ¢ 0.51
n + 1 ¢ 0.95 0.82 ¢ 0.78 ¢ 0.51
N ¢ 13.27 19.55 ¢ 33.33 ¢ 7.14
15 n ¢ 1.08 1.16 4.92 1.63 ¢ 0.44
n + 1 ¢ 0.63 1.16 0.78 1.63 ¢ 0.44
N ¢ 12.63 17.33 24.12 24.44 ¢ 6.67
16 n ¢ 0.73 1.48 1.27 ¢ ¢ 0.39
n + 1 ¢ 0.73 0.39 1.27 ¢ ¢ 0.39
N ¢ 11.72 17.13 20.31 ¢ ¢ 6.25
17 n ¢ 0.82 1.74 ¢ ¢ 11.78 0.35
n + 1 ¢ 0.51 0.63 ¢ ¢ 0.63 0.35
N ¢ 11.20 16.22 ¢ ¢ 32.99 5.88
18 n ¢ 0.58 0.82 ¢ ¢ 1.34 0.31
n + 1 ¢ 0.58 0.82 ¢ ¢ 1.34 0.31
N ¢ 10.49 14.81 ¢ ¢ 24.07 5.56
19 n ¢ 0.65 1.01 2.56 4.71 ¢ 0.28
n + 1 ¢ 0.42 0.34 0.59 0.60 ¢ 0.28
N ¢ 10.06 14.56 19.07 23.74 ¢ 5.26
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Table 3a. Expected payo®s (® = 1) continued
A
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 N
20 n ¢ 0.47 1.17 0.85 1.00 ¢ 0.25
n + 1 ¢ 0.47 0.49 0.85 1.00 ¢ 0.25
N ¢ 9.50 13.89 17.00 20.00 ¢ 5.00
21 n ¢ 0.52 0.62 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.23
n + 1 ¢ 0.36 0.62 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.23
N ¢ 9.14 12.93 ¢ ¢ ¢ 4.76
22 n ¢ 0.39 0.74 1.35 ¢ ¢ 0.21
n + 1 ¢ 0.39 0.30 0.27 ¢ ¢ 0.21
N ¢ 8.68 12.68 16.78 ¢ ¢ 4.55
23 n ¢ 0.43 0.84 1.55 2.14 4.57 0.19
n + 1 ¢ 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.21 0.49 0.19
N ¢ 8.37 12.17 15.86 20.28 23.50 4.35
24 n ¢ 0.33 0.48 0.61 2.42 0.82 0.17
n + 1 ¢ 0.33 0.48 0.61 0.46 0.82 0.17
N ¢ 7.99 11.46 14.58 18.79 19.79 4.17
25 n ¢ 0.36 0.56 ¢ 0.67 ¢ 0.16
n + 1 ¢ 0.26 0.25 ¢ 0.67 ¢ 0.16
N ¢ 7.72 11.23 ¢ 16.80 ¢ 4.00
Notes: The ¯rst column reports the individual and aggregate payo®s under
the grand coalition when farsighted stable. The next ¯ve columns report the
expected payo®s under the equilibrium multi-member coalition structures re-
ported in Table 2. The last column (N) reports the analogous expected payo®s
under individual con°ict. The entries for n and n + 1 report the payo®s ex-
pected by each member of groups having respectively n and n + 1 members.
For symmetric groups, the same payo® is indicated for both groups. The entry
for N reports the expected payo®s summed over all individuals. [The individ-
ual payo®s might not sum to the aggregate payo®s due to rounding.] These
calculations assume that X = 100.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 30
Table 3b. Expected payo®s under equilibrium structures, ® = 1=4
A
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 N
9 n 3.70 7.54 5.76 ¢ 40.50 ¢ 1.23
n + 1 3.70 3.63 5.76 ¢ 1.98 ¢ 1.23
N 33.33 48.32 51.85 ¢ 56.36 ¢ 11.11
10 n 3.08 4.50 7.90 ¢ 4.80 ¢ 1.00
n + 1 3.08 4.50 1.40 ¢ 4.80 ¢ 1.00
N 30.77 45.00 52.98 ¢ 48.00 ¢ 10.00
11 n 2.60 5.26 9.56 16.27 ¢ 39.64 0.83
n + 1 2.60 2.85 2.82 2.50 ¢ 1.59 0.83
N 28.57 43.38 51.22 55.00 ¢ 55.56 9.09
12 n 2.22 3.40 3.97 4.17 ¢ 3.89 0.69
n + 1 2.22 3.40 3.97 4.17 ¢ 3.89 0.69
N 26.67 40.74 47.62 50.00 ¢ 46.67 8.33
13 n 1.92 3.88 5.08 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.59
n + 1 1.92 2.29 1.39 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0.59
N 25.00 39.28 47.62 ¢ ¢ ¢ 7.69
14 n 1.68 2.65 5.99 7.38 15.49 ¢ 0.51
n + 1 1.68 2.65 2.21 0.96 1.92 ¢ 0.51
N 23.53 37.14 46.03 51.97 53.98 ¢ 7.14
15 n 1.48 2.98 2.89 8.61 3.26 ¢ 0.44
n + 1 1.48 1.87 2.89 2.00 3.26 ¢ 0.44
N 22.22 35.86 43.33 49.86 48.89 ¢ 6.67
16 n 1.32 2.13 3.55 2.90 ¢ ¢ 0.39
n + 1 1.32 2.13 1.24 2.90 ¢ ¢ 0.39
N 21.05 34.09 42.95 46.43 ¢ ¢ 6.25
17 n 1.18 2.36 4.10 ¢ ¢ 15.00 0.35
n + 1 1.18 1.56 1.76 ¢ ¢ 1.56 0.35
N 20.00 32.96 41.59 ¢ ¢ 53.33 5.88
18 n 1.06 1.75 2.19 4.62 7.11 2.67 0.31
n + 1 1.06 1.75 2.19 0.97 0.73 2.67 0.31
N 19.05 31.48 39.51 46.64 51.43 48.15 5.56
19 n 0.96 1.92 2.62 5.30 8.08 ¢ 0.28
n + 1 0.96 1.32 1.08 1.59 1.55 ¢ 0.28
N 18.18 30.42 39.00 44.98 49.08 ¢ 5.26
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Table 3b. Expected payo®s (® = 1=4) continued
A
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 N
20 n 0.87 1.46 2.98 2.13 2.29 ¢ 0.25
n + 1 0.87 1.46 1.43 2.13 2.29 ¢ 0.25
N 17.39 29.23 37.85 42.50 45.71 ¢ 5.00
21 n 0.79 1.59 1.72 2.68 ¢ ¢ 0.23
n + 1 0.79 1.13 1.72 0.43 ¢ ¢ 0.23
N 16.67 28.35 36.19 42.72 ¢ ¢ 4.76
22 n 0.73 1.24 2.01 3.16 ¢ 6.94 0.21
n + 1 0.73 1.24 0.94 0.88 ¢ 0.59 0.21
N 16.00 27.27 35.66 42.08 ¢ 51.09 4.55
23 n 0.67 1.34 2.26 3.58 4.37 7.75 0.19
n + 1 0.67 0.98 1.18 1.27 0.74 1.27 0.19
N 15.38 26.50 34.68 40.76 46.10 48.58 4.35
24 n 0.62 1.06 1.39 1.62 4.91 1.88 0.17
n + 1 0.62 1.06 1.39 1.62 1.24 1.88 0.17
N 14.81 25.56 33.33 38.89 44.38 45.24 4.17
25 n 0.57 1.15 1.59 1.97 1.68 ¢ 0.16
n + 1 0.57 0.86 0.81 0.47 1.68 ¢ 0.16
N 14.29 24.86 32.82 38.85 42.00 ¢ 4.00
Notes: The ¯rst column reports the individual and aggregate payo®s under
the grand coalition when farsighted stable. The next ¯ve columns report the
expected payo®s under the equilibrium multi-member coalition structures re-
ported in Table 2. The last column (N) reports the analogous expected payo®s
under individual con°ict. The entries for n and n + 1 report the payo®s ex-
pected by each member of groups having respectively n and n + 1 members.
For symmetric groups, the same payo® is indicated for both groups. The entry
for N reports the expected payo®s summed over all individuals. [The individ-
ual payo®s might not sum to the aggregate payo®s due to rounding.] These
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Table 4. Expected Payo®s Under Equilibrium Structures for N = 100
® = 0:00 ® = 0:01 ® = 0:10 ® = 1:00
A¤ (n;a) n
N n + 1
n
N n + 1
n
N n + 1
n
N n + 1
50 (2,0) 51.00 0.51 50.50 0.50 46.36 0.46 z25.50 0.26
0.51 0.50 0.46 0.26
34 (2,32) 67.00 11.39 66.35 11.54 z61.70 12.44 ¢ ¢
0.22 0.21 0.12 ¢
25 (4,0) 76.00 0.76 73.79 0.74 y58.46 0.58 19.00 0.19
0.76 0.74 0.58 0.19
20 (5,0) 81.00 0.81 77.88 0.78 57.86 0.58 16.20 0.16
0.81 0.78 0.58 0.16
17 (5,15) 84.00 3.36 80.36 3.35 58.29 3.01 16.10 1.11
0.56 0.52 0.31 0.06
15 (6,10) 86.00 2.29 81.84 2.26 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
0.25 0.20 ¢ ¢
13 (7,9) 88.00 2.01 82.80 1.97 54.53 1.55 ¢ ¢
0.44 0.39 0.15 ¢
12 (8,4) 89.00 1.34 83.20 1.28 ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
0.10 0.04 ¢ ¢
10 (10,0) 91.00 0.91 z83.49 0.83 47.89 0.48 9.10 0.09
0.91 0.83 0.48 0.09
8 (12,4) 93.00 1.24 y83.54 1.14 43.76 0.67 7.63 0.13
0.64 0.55 0.23 0.03
7 (14,2) 94.00 1.07 83.05 0.96 40.64 0.50 6.67 0.09
0.63 0.52 0.19 0.02
6 (16,4) 95.00 1.19 82.19 1.06 37.20 0.53 5.75 0.09
0.84 0.71 0.30 0.04
5 (20,0) 96.00 0.96 80.67 0.81 33.10 0.33 4.80 0.05
0.96 0.81 0.33 0.05
4 (25,0) 97.00 0.97 78.23 0.78 28.53 0.29 3.88 0.04
0.97 0.78 0.29 0.04
3 (33,1) ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 23.17 0.24 2.94 0.03
¢ ¢ 0.21 0.03
2 (50,0) 99.00 0.99 66.44 0.66 16.78 0.17 1.98 0.02
0.99 0.66 0.17 0.02
1 (100,0) z100.00 1.00 50.25 0.50 9.17 0.09 1.00 0.01
1.00 0.50 0.09 0.01
Notes: A¤ denotes the total number of groups, a of which have n + 1 members; the remaining
A¤ ¡a have n members. By construction, a(n+1)+(A¤ ¡a)n = 100. These calculations assume
X = 100. Under individual con°ict (A¤ = 100, n = 1), individual expected payo®s are 0.01,
and aggregate expected payo®s are 1.00. [The individual payo®s might not sum to the aggregate
payo®s due to rounding.] `z' indicates the structure yielding the highest aggregate expected payo®
and `y' indicates the symmetric structure yielding the highest aggregate payo®.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 33
Mathematical appendix
A.1 Preliminary results for stability and equilibrium
Lemma 1 Given any group structure with two or more stand-alone groups S =
fn1;:::;nA¡2;1;1g, all members i 2 Ak where nk ¸ 2 optimally choose not to
participate in the second-stage con°ict: m(nk;S) = 0.
Proof. The proof is only sketched here. By hypothesis, nA¡1 = nA = 1, implying
that F =
PA¡2
k=1 nk[1+®(nk¡1)]+2: Even supposing that nk = n1 ¸ 2 for k < A¡1,
such that F is equal to the largest possible value (given nA¡1 = nA = 1 and N),
F = (A ¡ 2)n1[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)] + 2, we would have F ¡ (A ¡ 1)n1[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)] ·
0, implying from (11) that members of group k = 1 choose not to participate:
m(n1;S) = 0. Then, F becomes F0 =
PA¡2
k=2 nk[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)] + 2. With repeated
applications of this logic, given S, one can show sequentially that the remaining
groups k ¸ 2, for which nk ¸ 2 holds, have no incentive to participate in the con°ict
over X.
Lemma 2 Stability of any given structure of groups, S = fn1;n2;:::;nAg, re-
quires mk > 0, for k = 1;2;:::;A.
Proof. Suppose there exists a stable structure of groups, S0, in which the members
i of one group k have no incentive to participate in the con°ict, m(nk;S0) = 0. By
(11), this group must be k = 1. Each member i 2 A1 obtains a payo® of just zero.
Yet, given the membership of all other groups, any i 2 A1 could secure a higher
expected payo® by competing for X on her own. Suppose that just one member
i 2 A1 breaks away, yielding the new partition S00 = S0rfn1g
S
fn1¡1;1g.41 Hence,
the original structure could not have been stable. Assuming that this deviation
does not a®ect the participation decision of the remaining members of group k = 1
(m(n1 ¡ 1;S00) = 0), the new structure is not stable either.42 Here, there are two
cases to consider:
Case 1. nk = 1, for k · A: If before the initial deviation, there had been one
or more stand-alone groups, by Lemma 1, that deviation would in turn push all
individuals remaining in a multi-member group (k for nk > 1) out of the con°ict
m(nk;S00) = 0.
41Under S




k=2 nk[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)] + 1. Then, from (12), u
e(1;S
00) = [F




42Members of even smaller groups k ¸ 2 might pull out of the con°ict for an expected
payo® of zero as well. That would not change the basic logic of the argument to follow.
If instead m(n1 ¡ 1;S
00) > 0, the new structure S
00 would be stable and the proof would
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Case 2. nA > 1. Each of the remaining members of group k = 1 could obtain a
higher payo® by competing for the contestable resource on her own as before. But
then, from Lemma 1, a move by any one of them would result in another partition,
S000 = S00 r fn1 ¡ 1g
S
fn1 ¡ 2;1g, such that anyone remaining in a multi-member
group (k for nk > 1) would pull out of the con°ict m(nk;S000) = 0.
In either case, all those individuals i 2 Ak with nk > 1 and thus ue(nk;S) = 0
would have an incentive to deviate from the existing structure of groups, S00 in case
1 and S000 in case 2. In the very least, each could leave her group to form a stand-
alone group and, regardless of others' choices, expect a positive payo® equal to
ue(1; e S) = X= e N2 where e S consists of e N · N singletons and N ¡ e N ¸ 0 individuals
belonging to one or more multi-member groups. Given a zero payo® from non-
participation, the incentive for any individual to move from her current multi-
member group to form a single-member \group" would remain strictly positive.43
Lemma 3 When the size of the largest group exceeds the smallest by 2 or more,
any member of the largest has an incentive to join one of the smaller groups, holding
the rest of the group structure (including the remainder of the largest group) ¯xed:
ue(nj+1;S0) > ue(n1;S), where n1 > nj+1 and S0 = Srfn1;njg
S
fn1¡1;nj+1g.
Proof. Using (12), it is necessary to verify that the following inequality holds:
[F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(nj + 1)(1 + ®nj)][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®nj)]
(nj + 1)(1 + ®nj)F
02 >
[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)]n1][F ¡ (A ¡ 1)[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)]]
[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)]n1F2 (A.1)
for n1 > nj + 1, where
F = [1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)]n1 + [1 + ®(nj ¡ 1)]nj + B
F0 = [1 + ®(n1 ¡ 2)](n1 ¡ 1) + [1 + ®nj](nj + 1)) + B
B =
P
k6=1;j[1 + ®(nk ¡ 1)]nk:
Assume that, under both group structures, mk > 0 for all k. Some straightforward
manipulations show that the inequality above will be satis¯ed if and only if the
43Given the focus on individual (uncoordinated) deviations in the analysis of equilib-
rium, it seems reasonable to conjecture a tendency towards individual con°ict.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 35
following condition is satis¯ed:
(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))n1F2£
£
[F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®nj)(nj + 1)][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®nj)] ¡




(nj + 1)(1 + ®nj)F
02 ¡ n1[1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)]F2¤
£
£
F ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))n1
¤£
F ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))
¤
: (A.2)
Note that if n1 = nj + 1, then F = F0 and the two sides of the expression are
identical and equal to 0. However, the assumption that n1 > nj + 1 implies F =
F0 + 2®(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1) > F 0, making the right-hand side of (A.2) negative. Thus, a
su±cient condition for (A.1) to hold when n1 > nj +1 is that the left-hand side of
(A.2) be positive. Further manipulations show that the left-hand side of (A.2) is
positive for n1 > nj + 1 if and only if,
(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))n1F2£
£
[(A ¡ 1)(®(n1 + nj) + 1) ¡ 2®][F0 ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®nj)] +
®(A ¡ 3)[F ¡ (A ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))n1]
¤
> 0: (A.3)
When A ¸ 3, the inequality clearly holds. When A = 2, there are just two groups
and the term B vanishes from F and F0. In this case, one can verify that the
condition above simpli¯es as follows:
(n1 ¡ nj ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1))n1F2£
£
[(n1 ¡ 1)(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 2)) + ®n2
j][®(n1 + nj ¡ 2) + 1] +
nj[®(n1 ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 + ®(nj ¡ 1))]
¤
> 0; (A.4)
where F = n1(1 + ®(n1 ¡ 1)) + nj(1 + ®(nj ¡ 1)). Clearly this condition holds for
n1 > nj +1. Therefore, in equilibrium, the di®erence in the sizes of any two groups
cannot be greater than 1; it must be 0 or 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: symmetric groups
Suppose ® 2 [0;1], and consider symmetric groups ^ S¤, where n¤ ¸ 2. Since groups
are all of the same size and n¤ ¸ 2, no individual would have an incentive to
leave her group to join another [Lemma 3]. By Proposition 1, the expected payo®s
under ^ S¤ ´ fn;:::;ng for A¤ > 1 and n¤ ¸ 2 are strictly greater than those
under individual con°ict, ¹ S ´ f1;1;:::;1g. Hence, any deviation which triggered
a reversion to individual con°ict would be considered unpro¯table relative to ^ S¤.
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Then there would be A¤ +1 groups: A¤ ¡1 groups of size n¤, the deviator's former
group of size n¤¡1, and the deviator's new single-member group. As one can verify
using (11), given the membership of the deviator's former group (n¤ ¡1 ¸ 1), such
a deviation from the symmetric structure would push the members of the other
original A¤ ¡ 1 groups to the corner m = 0 and, by the logic in Lemma 2, would
eventually trigger a reversion to individual con°ict.
Now consider the grand coalition (n = N), supposing that ® 2 [0;1). By
Proposition 1, the expected payo®s under the grand coalition are strictly greater
than those under individual con°ict. For ® 2 (0;1), one can easily con¯rm that
a deviation from the grand coalition by just one individual would push everyone
else to the corner solution (m = 0), thereby triggering a reversion to individual
con°ict. Thus, such a deviation cannot be pro¯table. For ® = 0, such a deviation
would leave each of the N ¡1 individuals remaining in the one large multi-member
group with an expected payo® identical to that expected under individual con°ict.
Though not at a corner solution, each individual would have an incentive to deviate
herself by forming her own \group" of just one member. If no one else were to do
the same, she could obtain a much higher expected payo®. But, of course, this
(second) deviation would push all others to the corner, eventually triggering a
reversion to individual con°ict. Since the payo® to individuals under the grand
coalition exceeds that when just one individual deviates, and the individual who
deviates next can do no worse from that point, it would be reasonable to expect the
second deviation to follow the ¯rst, which would make deviating from the grand
coalition unpro¯table when ® = 0. Thus, for ® 2 [0;1), the grand coalition is a
Nash equilibrium structure.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3: asymmetric groups
By construction, under S¤ each group is of size n or n+1, such that no individual
has an incentive to join another group [Lemma 3]. The inequality ensures, in
addition, that the expected payo® under that structure for any member belonging
to a size{n+1 group is greater than that under individual con°ict. Then, by (13),
members of all groups would consider any deviation which triggered a reversion
to individual con°ict to be unpro¯table relative to S¤. Thus, to verify that no
individual (belonging to an n+1-member group) would have an incentive to form a
group on her own, it is only necessary to show that the payo®s expected by another
under that hypothetical deviation are less than that under individual con°ict. For
a = 2;:::;A¤¡1 given N, such a deviation would result in a new partition with A+1
groups: A¤¡a+1 groups with n¤ members, a¡1 groups with n+1 members and 1
stand-alone group, implying that F¡A(n+1)(1+®n) = ¡(A¡a)(1+2®n)¡2®n < 0.Group Formation: Managing the Con°ict Within 37
Thus, from (11), an individual deviation to form a stand-alone group would push
the members of all the other a¡1 groups with n+1 members to the corner (m = 0)
for a zero payo®. By the reasoning of Lemma 2, such a deviation would trigger a
reversion to individual con°ict, and would therefore be deemed unpro¯table. For
a = 1, when an individual from the single group of size n + 1 forms a group on
her own, a new structure, again with A + 1 groups, emerges: A groups of size n
and one stand-alone group. In this case, such a deviation would not push anyone
away from an interior optimum. However, as long as the second inequality shown
in the proposition holds, everyone but the original deviator would be worse o®
than if there were no groups at all. Then, by the reasoning applied earlier, the
initial deviation would induce a reversion to individual con°ict, making everyone
including the original deviator worse o® relative to the initial group structure under
consideration.